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A
mAbstract
In Romania, the communist regime promoted an official policy of gender equality
for more than 40 years, providing equal access to education and employment and
restricting pay differentiation based on gender. After its fall in December 1989, the
promotion of equal opportunities and treatment for men and women did not
constitute a priority for any governments of the 1990s. This paper analyzes both
gender and occupational wage gaps before and during the first years of the transition
to a market economy and finds that the communist institutions did succeed in
eliminating the gender wage differences in female- and male-dominated occupations
but not in gender-integrated occupations. During both regimes, wage differences were,
in general, much higher among workers of the same gender working in different
occupations than between men and women working in the same occupational
group, and women experienced a larger variation in occupational wage differentials
than men.
JEL codes: J24; J31; J71; J78; P26; P27
Keywords: Romania; Transition; Female- and male-dominated occupations; Gender
wage gap; Occupational wage gap1 Introduction
The communist regimes in Eastern Europe institutionalized the principle of “equal pay
for equal work” and used centralized wage grids for wage-setting on the labor market
several decades before their fall in the beginning of the 1990s. Consequently, the wage
structure was identical for all workers in general and for men and women in particular.
Therefore, no wage discrimination based on gender should have existed during the
communist era.
In contrast, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy
resulted in a substantial and rapid change in the wage structure. Returns to both
measured skills (education, occupation) and unmeasured skills increased, and older
workers and women appear to be the groups that lost most from the transition
(Brainerd 2000). This opens up the question of whether the “planned equality” trans-
formed into a “market inequality” during the transition years. This paper attempts to
answer this question using data from cross-sectional household surveys conducted
during the transition years in Romania. The data provide unique retrospective infor-
mation about starting wages and occupations since 1960s.2015 Andrén and Andrén; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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the gender wage gap decreased during the first years of transition,1 and it has been rela-
tively stable through the 1990s in several transition economies (Newell and Reilly
2000). The pattern of the high concentration of women in occupations situated in the
lower part of the wage distribution had direct consequences for the gender wage gap.
The gender wage gap was also affected by changes in the overall wage distribution
(Brainerd 2000), the drop in the employment of low-wage female earners (Hunt 2002),
and the expansion of the high-wage service sector (Giddings 2002), which was typically
female-dominated before the transition. However, occupational segregation is not al-
ways to blame for most of the gender wage gap; rather, the gap is mostly a within-
occupation, within-establishment phenomenon (Jurajda 2003, 2005).
The only two studies of the gender wage gap in Romania during the first years of the
transition (e.g., Paternostro and Sahn 1999; Skoufias 2003) reported results similar to
those of studies that used data from other socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe: The gender wage gap generally diminishes in the transition process.
A few studies that analyze data a few years before the communist regimes’ fall re-
ported that the gender wage gap existed and was explained by occupational attainment
(e.g., Brainerd 2000, Giddings 2002 and Orazem and Vodopivec 2000). Atkinson and
Micklewright (1992) reported that the gender wage gap was substantial under com-
munism given the low wage dispersion. Ham et al. (1995) reported that the gender
wage gap is generally attributed to discriminatory promotion practices and to the segre-
gation of women into low-paying occupations. To our knowledge, no study has ana-
lyzed the occupational wage gap either in general or separately for men and women
before and after the fall of the communist regime.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature on the wage gap in transition
countries is threefold. First, we analyze the gender wage gap in Romania over almost
four decades of the communist regime and during the transition period, up to 2000.2
Second, we analyze the occupational wage gap in general and separately for men and
women. Third, in the empirical analysis, we use a structural approach that integrates
the occupational attainment and stratification for men and women and aspects of the
institutional settings.
We analyze the gender wage gap in Romania during the centrally planned period
with a follow-up period during the transition towards a market economy. The central-
ized wage-setting process in Romania during the communist regime did, in fact, follow
a standard set of rules based on industry, occupation, education level and length of
service. Because men worked more often in heavy industries, where occupations were
associated with higher risk and higher wages, and women worked more often in educa-
tion and healthcare sectors, where wages were, on average, lower, a wage gap between
men and women did, in effect, exist during these years. However, with no wage
discrimination in place, the wage gap between men and women should largely be
explained by occupation.
After the fall of communism in 1991, a new wage law formally decentralized wage
determination, prices were liberalized, and the process of the mass privatization of
state-owned enterprises began. Labor force participation is decreasing considerably for
both men and women, and wage structure is being determined autonomously through
collective or individual negotiations between employees and employers.
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promoting equal pay for equal job types, then controlling for job characteristics should
generate an adjusted wage gap of zero; 2) the process of labor reallocation caused by the
economic transition had an effect not only on the occupational distribution of men and
women but also on the gender wage gap; and 3) the process of labor reallocation also had
an effect on the occupational wage gap in general and for men and women separately.
The analysis is based on data drawn from the Romanian Integrated Household
Survey, which includes a representative sample for each year. For the socialist years,
1960–1989, we use retrospective information from the 1994 survey, and for the ana-
lyzed transition years, we use the annual household survey (1994, 1996, 1998, and
2000). Except for Münich et al. (2005), who estimate returns to human capital for men
in the Czech Republic during the communist period 1948–1989 and the transition
period 1991–1996, no other data set provides information on individuals for such long
periods of time during communism.
We find that in Romania, the average female worker earned approximately 72% of the
mean male wage during the communist era, but contrary to previous studies, this observed
gender wage gap remained almost constant over time. However, the relative importance of
the individual components of the wage decomposition varies across years, with much
higher variations in both female-dominated and male-dominated occupations during the
transition period. Our results support our hypotheses that 1) there was a gender wage gap
during the communist regime; 2) the occupational attainment explained a large part of the
gender wage gap; and 3) there are differences in the occupational wage gap between men
and women during the years of the planned economy and the market economy.
The paper will proceed with Section 2, which briefly explains some institutional
aspects of Romania during the communist regime and the transition period. Section 3
outlines the empirical specification. The data and the samples used in the paper are
presented in Section 4, and the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 summa-
rizes the paper and discusses policy implications.
2 Human capital and wage formation in Romania
In Romania, the communist regime proclaimed from its establishment in the middle
of the 1940s that liberty, gender equality and the emancipation of women were some
of the main targets in the development of the new socialist society. A nationwide
campaign was launched to eliminate female illiteracy, to increase the enrollment of
women in secondary schools and universities, and to increase female employment
outside of the household. Before the communist regime’s fall in 1989, the official sta-
tistics show a) a relatively high and gender-neutral proportion of young people who
were enrolled in high schools or universities: Approximately 70% of males aged 15–
19 years and approximately 72% of females of the same age were enrolled in high
schools, and approximately 6% of both males and females aged 19–25 years were en-
rolled in some form of higher education (National Commission for Statistics 1995); b)
the literacy rates were 95.6% for women and 98.6% for men (UNESCO 2002); and c)
the workforce participation rates were high relative to Western standards for both
women (approximately 90-95%) and men (approximately 100 percent).
During the communist regime’s years, all citizens of working-age who had a work
capacity had the right and duty to work and were guaranteed a job, but labor markets
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tral allocation of university graduates to jobs, and a centralized wage-setting process
with a standard set of rules based on industry, occupation, and length of service. Wages
were set according to industry-specific wage grids and varied only with the difficulty of
the job and with the worker’s education and work experience but not with gender.
After the fall of communism in December 1989, the new wage law of February 1991
formally decentralized wage determination in Romania. All state and privately owned
commercial companies were granted the right to determine their wage structure
autonomously through collective or individual negotiations between employees and
employers. All restrictions on eligibility for promotion, bonuses, and internal and exter-
nal migration were lifted. Additionally, the hours of work per week were reduced from
46 to 40 without any decrease in monthly wages (Skoufias 2003).
The structural starting point of the economic transformation was an oversized state-
owned industry characterized by low competition and weak interaction with the world
market. Despite still being the majority owner, the state intervention had been limited
to periodic wage indexations only for state institutions to diminish the increasing gap
caused by more rapid wage increases in some industries because of the negotiations
of collective and individual contracts. The wage setting, supplemented by price
liberalization and privatization and a lack of (the enforcement of ) laws had an effect
on labor market participation (Earle and Sapatoru 1993), occupational attainment
and, nonetheless, on people’s opinion about their opportunities and their place on the
labor market. On the 2000 Gender Barometer, about half of the interviewees answered
that real equality of rights between men and women does not exist.3 The majority
(75-88%) considered gender not to be important in some occupations with respect
to whom should be employed (e.g., media, nongovernmental organizations, public
administration, health, agriculture and banking) but that men should be employed
in mining and metallurgy and construction, and women should be employed in the
textile industry.
3 Empirical framework
Several papers have analyzed occupational segregation and wages by estimating the
effect of women’s density in different occupations on individual wages. A potential
problem in these studies is the endogeneity of occupational choice. Except for a few
studies that do take this problem into account,4 most of the literature is based on the
assumption that occupational attainment is exogenous. To analyze the gender wage
gap within and between occupational groups, we chose to formulate a selection model
with an endogenous switch among three broad types of occupational groups. We there-
fore specify a separate wage equation for each occupational group that will be esti-
mated for both men and women separately:
Y 1 ¼ Xβ1 þ U1male‐dominated MDð Þoccupations; ð1Þ
Y 2 ¼ Xβ2 þ U2 gender‐integrated GIð Þoccupations; ð2Þ
Y 3 ¼ Xβ3 þ U3 female‐dominated FDð Þoccupations; ð3Þ
where Yj represents the market wage (in a logarithmic form) for a given individualin occupational group j, j =1, 2 or 3; group 1 represents male-dominated (MD)
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resents female-dominated (FD) occupations. X is a matrix with explanatory variables
associated with the market wage, and βj is the corresponding parameter vector, which
is unique for each occupational group.
The occupational choice is based on taste or the propensity for a specific occupation,
which is located in one of the predefined occupational groups. The choice mechanism
for the individual is specified as a linear latent variable model:
D ¼ Zγ þ ε; ð4Þ
where Z is a matrix with explanatory variables associated with the occupational pro-pensity score, and γ is the corresponding parameter vector for these variables. The
dependent latent variable D* represents the propensity to choose a male-dominated
occupation. A low value of D* represents a low propensity to choose a male dominated
occupation, which should be seen as equivalent to a high propensity to choose a
female-dominated occupation. If the latent variable takes a value between a high and a
low value, the individual will choose an occupation from the gender-integrated group.5
The parameter estimates from the model are used to compute the components of the
gender wage gap for the entire sample (i.e., all occupations together) and for occupa-
tional groups (i.e., MD, GI and FD occupations) and to compute the occupational wage
gap for men and women separately.6
The nature of the model allows us to decompose the total wage gap into four mutu-
ally exclusive components. The first component is related to endowments and is based
on differences in observables such as age and education. The second component (the
occupational effect) is related to the differences between men and women in both the
structure of occupational attainment and their qualifications for the chosen occupation.
The third component (the selectivity effect) is related to the self selection into occupa-
tions that is driven by unobservables. Because the occupational choice is made on the
basis of individuals’ preferences, skills, or abilities related to different work tasks, this
choice could potentially affect the wages positively under the assumption that strong
preferences and productivity have a positive association. If the mean selection effect for
men is stronger than that for women, the total effect will be positive. However, if the
sorting into different occupational groups is random, the effect will be zero. The fourth
component is related to differences in return to observables between men and women.
In a situation with no discrimination, this component will be zero. However, it is import-
ant to recognize that a non-zero effect also could be a result of not controlling for all rele-
vant variables. The fourth component is therefore referred to as the unexplained effect.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us not only to estimate the wage
effect of female density in any given occupation but also to estimate the unexplained
gender wage gap within a given occupation and how this gap varies across occupational
groups. In addition, it is possible to test whether the returns to endowments differ
across both gender and occupations. However, there are at least two problems with this
approach: 1) finding valid instruments for occupational choices to secure identification
and 2) the accuracy of the occupational aggregation. Concerning the first problem, it is
generally difficult to obtain observable characteristics that influence occupational
choice but not wages. Our attempt to address this issue will be discussed and motivated
in the data section below. In regard to the aggregation of occupation choices, we chose
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broad categories, as described above.
4 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis are drawn from the Romanian Integrated
Household Survey (RIHS). For the socialist years, 1960–1989, we use retrospective
information from the 1994 survey, and for the analyzed transition years, we use
the annual household survey (1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000).8 The number of obser-
vations that include information about the wages and explanatory variables
relevant for analysis vary across the cross-sections, starting at 25,565 in 1994,
decreasing to 21,518 in 1998, and decreasing to 17,480 in 2000. The historical
labor force data provide information on starting wages and occupation for
approximately 12,000 individuals.
The net monthly wage is computed as earnings on the primary job in the previous
month minus taxes and other mandatory contributions. The wage variable refers to the
previous month from 1994 to 2000 and to the starting wage from 1960 to 1989. The
rankings of different industries were stable over time, but there is a degree of variation
in the magnitude of wage differentials among occupations during transition years, when
certain industries pay all types of workers high wages (e.g., the banks) and others pay
all types of workers relatively low wages. However, the wage structure has been remark-
ably stable during the communist era, and therefore the starting wages can be used
from 1950 to 1989. Our concerns are gender and occupational wage gaps rather than
the overall level of real wages, so our approach to estimating repeated cross-sections
involves no deflation of the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the significant inflation
during the 1990s requires some within-survey period adjustments, for which we use
monthly dummies. The evolution of women’s net monthly wages relative to men’s
varied between 84% in 1971–75 and 91% during 1986–89 (Figure 1). Compared to the
female–male wage ratio reported by Brainerd (2000), the Romanian values were close
to those in Columbia (85% in 1988) and Sweden (84% in 1992) but higher than those
in the USA (70% in 1987) and the Russian Republic (69% in 1989).
The next important variable in our analysis is occupation. Using a conventional
approach that sorts occupations into three groups based on the proportion of female
workers in the occupation,9 we define occupations with less than 33% women as being
male-dominated and occupations with more than 67% women as being female-
dominated. The remaining occupations are referred to as gender integrated.10 The
highest difference in wages between men and women was in the gender-integrated
group; the women’s net monthly wages were approximately 80% those of the men’s dur-
ing the transition years. The smallest difference was in the female-dominated group,
where women earned, on average, approximately 90-95% of men’s monthly wages from
1981–1996 (Figure 1).
In the period before 1989, the relative differences in the net monthly wages among
the three occupational groups suggest that there was a moving trend towards the
equalization of occupational wage differences for both men and women (Figure 2).
Regardless of their gender, people working in male-dominated occupations earned
more than people working in gender-integrated occupations, but this relationship
switched directions after 1994 and increased again in 1996 and 1997. Furthermore, the
Figure 1 The women’s monthly net wages relative to men’s (in %).
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years was different for men and women, suggesting that market mechanisms can gener-
ate occupational wage differences. The occupational wage differences were larger for
women than for men after 1994. For men, there was basically no difference between
gender-integrated and female-dominated occupations, whereas women working in theFigure 2 The relative monthly net wages between occupations (in %) by gender.
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of gender-integrated occupations.
Another group of variables important in analyzing the effect of occupational selection
on domain-specific wages were the instruments for occupational choices. It is generally
difficult to obtain observable characteristics that influence occupational choice but not
wages. Using data for several years characterized by different structural changes in the
economy makes it even harder to find instruments that work well for both men and
women for all years. However, the institutional settings during the analyzed period
suggest that the wage differentiation based on gender was restricted under central plan-
ning and even in the beginning of the transition period. Wages were set according to
industry-specific wage grids and varied only with the difficulty of the job and with
workers’ education and experience, not with gender. Additionally, under the central
plan, given their last completed level of education and their ranking (based on the aca-
demic grades and political, cultural and even sportive involvement), people could
choose from a given and very limited list of jobs. Therefore, we argue that the last com-
pleted level of schooling is an exogenous source of variation in occupational attainment
that allows us to identify the causal effect of occupation. More exactly, after finishing
compulsory education (i.e., 8 years of schooling), people had to pass an admissions test
to continue their education at the high school level. A majority of those who did not
pass the test instead continued into vocational schools (Most of the time, vocational
programs lasted 1–2 years at the workplace). Those who passed the test were admitted
to high school (lyceums), which could be general (e.g., mathematics-physics, natural
sciences, and philosophy-history), specialized (e.g., economics, pedagogy, health care,
and art), industrial or agro-industrial. After two years of high school, students had to
pass a new test to continue the last two years of high school. When finishing these two
additional years, students had to pass another set of tests to receive a high school dip-
loma. Only people who had a high school diploma could then take the university ad-
missions test (University education was 3–6 years). High school graduates who were
not admitted to a university usually did not have many occupational choices; only a few
(usually those who graduated from a specialized high school) had a specific context for
their occupation (e.g., nurses or teachers in pre-school and primary education). Of
those who were not admitted to a university, graduates from general high schools had,
on average, better academic merits and human capital than their peers who had gradu-
ated from industrial and agro-industrial high schools, but there were no clear rules for
who would get the most attractive job. Sometimes, they had to compete even with their
peers who graduated from a shorter vocational program (from vocational schools).
These are some of the institutional settings that suggest that wages were related to
occupation based on a combination of factors, such as education, job, and task-specific
requirements during the analyzed years (both before 1989 and in the first years of the
transition). Due to this combination, it happened that people in different occupations
with different levels of education but different working conditions had almost the same
salary.
Hence, to control for the effect of education on wages and occupational attainment,
respectively, we use two different groups of education dummies. The first group, used
in the wage equations, includes three variables for education level: lower, medium and
higher. The second group, used in the selection equation, includes five variables for
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high school, and university. The “lower” category in the wage equation covers “compul-
sory” (which can be 4 or 8 years) and “vocational” in the selection equation, whereas
“medium” covers “high school” and “post-high school”; and “higher” is the same as
“university.” Due to these differences, we use “vocational”, “2 or 4 years of high school”,
and “post high school” as instruments. In addition to these instruments, we use three
region dummies that control for occupational “specialization” within ethnic groups
[(Borjas (1992, 1995) and Lehrer (2004)]. We control for this effect through geograph-
ical regions. Following the same strategy as for education, the regions are aggregated in
different groups of dummies: (i) four dummies for the richest geographical regions (R4-
R8), in the wage equations; and (ii) five dummies for regions with a large majority of
ethnic Romanians (R1-R4 and R8) in comparison with the regions with a relatively high
proportion ethnic Hungarians,11 in the selection equation. Although our instrumental
variables are significantly correlated with the occupation, we are aware of our limited
theoretical considerations and intuition to support the validity condition. Therefore, we
suggest that our results should be interpreted with caution.5 Results
We estimate a selection model with an endogenous switch among three broad types of
occupational groups defined by their gender composition: male-dominated, gender-
integrated, and female-dominated occupations. The parameters for the occupational
selection equation and the domain-specific wage equations are estimated simultaneously.5.1 Selection into occupational groups
The parameters for the occupational selection equation and the domain-specific wage
equations are estimated simultaneously. Table 1 presents the estimates of the selection
equations for men and women, respectively.12
Additionally, Table 1 presents the estimated variances and covariances of the error
terms of the wage and selection equations, which provide useful information regarding
the sorting behavior of individuals across groups. The estimated coefficients of the
occupational selection (or attainment) equation indicate that the probability of working
in a given occupational group (i.e., MD, GI or FD) differs between men and women.
Although it is not possible to pinpoint a clear trend, the parameters suggest that men’s
preferences for a given occupation were more stable than women’s. Women’s correla-
tions between observables and occupational choice are less stable over time. However,
when these correlations are statistically significant, they suggest that women changed
their preferences during the transition years. The differences between men and women
during the communist era might be due to the big changes in the economy during that
time (such as industrialization, the mass privatization of agriculture, and the prohib-
ition of abortion), and the differences during the transition years might indicate the
collapse of the socialist support for women but also the changes in the economy and
society, which might have changed women’s work preferences and/or opportunities.
However, the covariances for 2000 are positive for both men and women, indicating a
negative selection effect for people who chose to work in male-dominated occupations
and a positive selection effect for those who worked in female-dominated occupations.
Table 1 Selection equation estimates, by gender, 1960-2000
Women Men
1960- 89 1994 1996 1998 2000 1960- 89 1994 1996 1998 2000
c1 −0.894 *** −0.510 ** −1.072 *** −1.345 *** −0.682 ** −1.285 *** −0.938 *** −0.544 *** −0.610 *** −0.754 ***
c2 2.138 *** 2.112 *** 1.658 *** 1.547 *** 2.149 *** 1.595 *** 1.698 *** 2.174 *** 2.214 *** 1.931 ***
Age 0.425 *** 0.365 *** 0.004 0.000 0.274 * −0.119 −0.303 *** −0.008 0.029 −0.009
Age2/10 −0.049 ** −0.034 ** 0.014 0.005 −0.024 0.026 0.048 *** 0.007 0.003 0.012
Educational Level1)
Vocational 0.113 * 0.222 *** 0.219 *** 0.253 *** 0.182 *** −0.128 ** 0.155 *** 0.105 *** 0.097 *** −0.255 ***
High school 2 years# 0.766 *** 0.802 *** 0.173 *** 0.226 *** 0.273 *** 0.208 *** 0.372 *** 0.034 0.139 *** −0.172 ***
High school 4 years 0.934 *** 0.975 *** 0.932 *** 0.403 *** 0.421 *** −0.017
After high school 0.922 *** 0.718 *** 0.805 *** 1.066 *** 1.033 *** 0.719 *** 0.689 *** 0.634 *** 0.652 *** −0.546 ***
University 0.163 0.159 *** 0.296 *** 0.347 *** 0.343 *** 0.076 0.470 *** 0.381 *** 0.466 *** 0.065
Region
R1: North-East −0.101 * −0.174 *** −0.185 *** −0.240 *** −0.173 *** −0.010 −0.107 *** −0.182 *** −0.151 *** 0.033
R2: South-East −0.067 −0.008 −0.087 ** −0.151 *** −0.101 ** −0.277 *** 0.047 −0.047 −0.110 *** −0.183 ***
R3:South 0.057 −0.114 *** −0.072 * −0.122 *** −0.094 ** −0.145 ** −0.064 ** −0.140 *** −0.128 *** −0.089 **
R4: South-West −0.017 −0.075 * −0.162 *** −0.200 *** −0.215 *** 0.007 −0.050 −0.086 ** −0.076 * 0.019
R8: Bucharest 0.154 * −0.090 ** −0.050 −0.055 −0.089 * −0.023 0.096 ** 0.043 −0.025 −0.099 **
Hungarians*Center −0.225 −0.403 −0.150 0.242 −0.434 −0.761 −0.287 −0.185 0.101 −0.428
Married −0.046 −0.013 0.031 −0.030 0.004 −0.046 −0.127 *** −0.105 *** −0.225 *** −0.071 *
Urban −0.109 ** 0.072 ** −0.020 −0.056 −0.014 0.034 0.032 −0.009 0.026 0.082 ***
Ethnicity2)
Romanian −0.234 * −0.083 −0.025 −0.003 −0.015 −0.212 * −0.042 −0.053 −0.154 * −0.009

















Table 1 Selection equation estimates, by gender, 1960-2000 (Continued)
Agriculture −0.538 *** −0.563 *** −0.327 *** −0.208 ** −0.523 *** −0.457 *** −0.352 *** −0.437 ***
Industry −0.565 *** −0.477 *** −0.428 *** −0.433 *** 0.127 *** 0.217 *** 0.227 *** 0.116 ***
Private ownership 0.406 *** 0.046 0.034 −0.040 −0.135 *** −0.179 ** 0.138 *** 0.099 *** 0.065 ** 0.107 ***
Children aged < 18 −0.072 *** −0.048 *** −0.042 *** −0.041 *** −0.006 −0.020 0.010 0.010 0.020 −0.022 *
Multi-generation household −0.086 0.058 0.014 −0.097 ** 0.062 0.034 0.010 0.065 * 0.033 0.109 ***
Variance-covariances
Var(U1) 0.158 ** 0.230 *** 0.231 *** 0.276 *** 0.274 *** 0.143 *** 0.233 *** 0.266 *** 0.259 *** 0.363 ***
Var(U2) 0.362 *** 0.196 *** 0.196 *** 0.180 *** 0.201 *** 0.246 *** 0.203 *** 0.203 *** 0.186 *** 0.210 ***
Var(U3) 0.275 *** 0.236 *** 0.209 *** 0.159 *** 0.188 *** 0.148 *** 0.177 *** 0.129 *** 0.156 ** 0.464 ***
Cov(U1, ε) −0.241 −0.284 *** −0.332 *** −0.380 *** −0.381 *** 0.010 −0.329 *** −0.402 *** −0.391 *** 0.516 ***
Cov(U2, ε) −0.300 *** −0.245 *** −0.279 *** −0.292 *** −0.319 *** 0.142 *** −0.264 *** −0.293 *** −0.271 *** 0.292 ***
Cov(U3, ε) −0.461 *** −0.374 *** −0.271 *** −0.162 ** −0.243 *** −0.103 −0.255 ** −0.085 0.139 0.619 ***
Likelihood −6266.7 −12476.5 −11197.5 −9426.8 −8267.2 −6923.4 −17877.1 −15364.5 −13023.9 −10944
Notes: The estimate is significant at the 10% level (*), at the 5% level (**), and at the 1% level (***). These notes hold for all tables of estimates. (1)The comparison group is compulsory; (2)the comparison group is all
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ing the existence of hierarchical sorting. This finding indicates that women performed
similarly in all occupational groups during both the communist regimes and the transi-
tion years. However, this was not the case for men.
For men, the covariances have different signs for the communist period, which sug-
gests that men’s sorting into occupational groups during this regime was consistent
with the theory of comparative advantage (Roy 1951), which suggests that those who
perform relatively well in one occupational group will perform relatively more poorly
in another occupational group. More exactly, a given man selected the occupation that
paid him better than the average worker with the same characteristics and under the
same working circumstances. Except for 2000, when all were positive, the correlations
were negative for all the other transition years, suggesting hierarchical sorting. This
sorting structure implies that there was a positive selection into one group and a nega-
tive selection into the other group.
In addition to the notable differences in the sorting behavior of men and women
across occupational groups revealed by the covariance parameters, the other parame-
ters also reveal differences between men and women during the two eras. We use age
as a proxy for the different regulation and structural changes that people born in differ-
ent cohorts were facing. We use the continuous variable instead of age intervals to
avoid multicollinearity with the educational dummies. The estimated parameters are
significant for women during the communist period and in 1994 and 2000 but only
for men in 1994, and they indicate that the probability of choosing a female-dominated
occupation increased with age during these years.
The highest education level attained is strongly correlated with both the men’s and
women’s occupational choice. However, women’s parameters are much higher than men’s
and are always positive, a finding that suggests that women are more oriented towards
female-dominated occupations when they have schooling beyond compulsory education.
During all analyzed years of the transition, the higher education parameter is statistically
significant only for men, which indicates the collapse of the socialist support for women
in male-dominated occupations but also the freedom of the market economy, which
restructures jobs, occupations and the way men and women choose their occupations.
The geographical region where people live was also correlated with the occupational
choice of both men and women; both men and women living in some regions with a
large majority of ethnic Romanians (R1 and R2, which are also relatively poorer
regions) had a lower probability of choosing to work in a female-dominated occupation
than those living in a region with an ethnic overrepresentation (R5-R7). However, being
an ethnic Hungarian living in a region with a relatively high concentration of ethnic
Hungarians did not have a statistically significant effect on occupational choice. This
finding might suggest that the policy of territorial development during the communist
years made the regions with an ethnic overrepresentation more heterogeneous than the
others. The same explanation might be used for the relationship between people living
in urban areas and occupational choice, which was statistically significant for men in
2000 and for women during the communist regime and in 1994. Women who lived in
an urban area had a lower probability of choosing a female-dominated occupation dur-
ing the communist regime but a higher probability in 1994. Men who lived in an urban
area had a higher probability of working in a female-dominated occupation in 2000.
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ive for men to work in occupations within the banking and insurance industries or as
real estate agents and accountants. The results for the communist period might be ex-
plained by the concentration of big industries in the urban area, whereas the results for
the transition might indicate that the changes in that era (such as the restructuring or
the total collapse of the big industrial firms and the entire agricultural system as well as
the increased private initiatives oriented primarily towards commerce and services) re-
allocated male labor towards female-dominated occupations.
The effect of the number of children younger than 18 in the household on occupa-
tional choice was significant (and negative) for women in all years except in 2000 but
only in 2000 for men. The significant parameters indicate that those with more children
were more likely to work in male-dominated or gender-integrated occupations, which
suggests that family structure might influence occupational choice.5.2 Decomposing the gender wage gap
5.2.1 The overall gender wage gap
Table 2 presents the evolution of the observed gender wage gap and its components for
the entire sample (i.e., all occupational groups together). The first component of the
decomposition is related to endowments and comes from differences in observables
such as age, education, and other socioeconomic factors important for wage setting.
The second component (referred to as the occupational effect) is related to differences
between men and women in both the structure of occupational attainment and their
qualifications for their chosen occupation. The third component (referred to as the se-
lectivity effect) is related to self-selection into occupations, which is driven by the un-
observables. Because occupational choice is made on the basis of an individual’s
preferences, skills, or abilities related to different work tasks, this self-selected choice
could potentially affect the wages positively under the assumption that strong prefer-
ences and productivity have a positive association. If the mean selection effect for men
is stronger than for women, the total effect will be positive (as was the case in all
analyzed years except 2000). However, if the sorting into different occupations is
random, the corresponding effect will be zero. The fourth component (referred to as
the unexplained effect) comes from differences in the return to observables between
men and women. Except for 2000, when the magnitude of this component was very
low, all other transition years had values higher than before 1989.
The observed overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean
log wages of male and female workers, stood at 0.28 during the communist era. In
other words, the average female worker earned approximately 72% of the mean male
wage. Whereas the observed gender wage gap has remained almost constant during the
transition period, the relative importance of the individual components of the decom-
position varies across years, with much higher variations in both female-dominated and
male-dominated occupations. These results support our earlier hypotheses and expla-
nations about the effects of the structural changes in the economy during the transition
period on both labor reallocation and wage setting across occupations. The communist
direction of gender equality spotlighted examples of “women heroes” working in
typically masculine areas, i.e., in mines underground, in industrial, chemical, and
Table 2 Overall gender wage gap decomposition, all occupations 1960-2000
1960-1989 1994 1996 1998 2000
Observed 0.280 0.205 0.221 0.189 0.214
Endowments 0.048 −0.016 −0.009 −0.016 −0.015
Occupational 0.001 −0.125 −0.091 −0.041 0.252
Selectivity 0.050 0.040 0.035 0.022 −0.061
Unexplained 0.172 0.302 0.286 0.223 0.036
Notes: Observed represents total wage gap in mean wages. The total wage gap is decomposed into four parts: Endowments
that represents the contribution to the wage gap from differences in observables; Occupational represents the contribution
from unequal distribution of men and women over occupational groups; Selectivity represents the contribution from
differences in unobservables and finally, Unexplanied that represents the contribution from differences in return
to observables.
Andrén and Andrén IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:10 Page 14 of 27metallurgical operations, and in areas such as surgery and experimental sciences. Our
results show that on average, women were better off during the transition. However,
this holds only for the formal market. Given that the informal market was growing sub-
stantially during the analyzed years of transition, it might be that, on average, women
are much more discriminated now.
Our results suggest that some of the traditional motivations for the existence of the
gender wage gap, as in Becker’s (1957) model, are not supported by the institutional
settings of a planned economy (education, experience, and the discriminatory tastes of
employers, co-workers, or customers). Although women were expected to deliver in-
creasingly more children (due to the 1966 abortion ban and almost no information
about or supply of birth control), and the Romanian society is characterized by strong
cultural traditions that hold women responsible for the proper functioning of the
household, women (from our samples) invested in education and worked in almost the
same way that men did. Women tended to work the same amount of work hours as
men (in the same occupation), but due to the cultural norms, women continued to
spend longer hours doing housework, which might have decreased their labor product-
ivity in the workplace. However, they received fixed monthly wages instead of decreased
wages, as Becker (1985) suggested (for a market economy). This was the case even dur-
ing the first years of transition.
5.2.2 The gender wage gap by occupational group
Table 3 presents the decomposition within each occupational group, which, for obvious
reasons, does not include any occupational effect other then the effect that comes from
self-selection. The wage differential between males and females was different across
groups, with the highest observed differences in the gender-integrated occupations dur-
ing all analyzed years. In this group, the observed gender wage gap was highest during
the communist regime, whereas the observed wage gaps for the other two groups were
almost zero: 2.7% in male-dominated occupations and 0.1% in female-dominated occu-
pations. These numbers are in accordance with the official policy of gender equality
during the communist regime, when wages were set according to industry-specific
wage grids and varied only with the difficulty of the job and with workers’ education
and experience, not with gender. Compared to other groups, the female-dominated
occupations were characterized by a lower difficulty of job tasks and a lower risk for ac-
cidents, which implies a lower “bonus.” These occupations were also more homogenous
Table 3 Gender wage gap decomposition by sector, 1960-2000
1960-1989 1994 1996 1998 2000
Male-dominated (MD) occupations
Observed 0.027 0.164 0.099 0.081 0.146
Endowments −0.096 −0.026 −0.049 −0.043 −0.116
Selectivity −0.481 −0.073 −0.077 −0.204 −1.394
Unexplained 0.585 0.257 0.226 0.333 1.649
Gender-integrated (GI) occupations
Observed 0.316 0.217 0.245 0.202 0.219
Endowments 0.070 −0.016 −0.006 −0.013 −0.011
Selectivity 0.040 −0.104 −0.103 −0.102 0.054
Unexplained 0.198 0.332 0.352 0.315 0.177
Female-dominated (FD) occupations
Observed 0.009 0.110 0.115 0.081 0.145
Endowments −0.051 −0.009 0.002 −0.025 0.015
Selectivity 0.516 −0.053 0.186 0.551 1.723
Unexplained −0.458 0.168 −0.068 −0.446 −1.590
Notes: Observed represents total wage gap in mean wages. The total wage gap is decomposed into three parts:
Endowments that represents the contribution to the wage gap from differences in observables; Selectivity represents the
contribution from differences in unobservables and, Unexplanied that represents the contribution from differences in
return to observables.
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first four grades had graduated from specialized high schools), which also implies rela-
tively lower wages. On the contrary, almost all male-dominated occupations were char-
acterized by some degree of difficulty and/or risk, which increased the average wages.
Moreover, it may have happened that women who worked in that occupational group
chose occupations with a lower degree of difficulty, and therefore, their average wages
were lower. The gender-integrated occupations may have included a diversity of occu-
pations that could be rewarded differently because of the different degrees of difficulty
and various levels of education. The selection into these occupations may explain the
gender wage gap. However, the endowments, or the part of the gender wage gap ex-
plained by the observables, offer another picture of the gender gap. The explained part
is negative and much higher in magnitude than the observed gender wage gap in both
male-dominated and female-dominated occupations. This finding indicates that
women’s returns to endowments were higher than those of their male peers. This was
not the case for the gender-integrated occupations, where the observables explain ap-
proximately 26% of the gender wage gap.
During the analyzed transition years, the observed gender wage gap increased in
male-dominated and female-dominated occupations and decreased in gender-
integrated occupations, although the magnitude was still the highest in this sector. The
observed gaps were the same in the male- and female-dominated occupations in 1998
(approximately 8%) and 2000 (approximately 14.5%). Except for female-dominated oc-
cupations in 1996 and 2000, the component of the gap explained by the observables
was negative for all other analyzed years and sectors. In the gender-integrated and
female-dominated occupations, the magnitude of this component was (approximately
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the magnitude was relatively higher than in the other sectors (0.04) and even higher in
2000 (0.116) than during the communist period. It is notable that when controlling for
selection into an occupation, the unexplained component of the gender wage gap
varied greatly across years in the male-dominated occupations, and it was almost
the mirror image of the evolution of this component for the female-dominated oc-
cupations. This finding suggests once more that the transition changes had a direct
effect on the labor reallocation of men and women but also on the pay in various
female-dominated occupations (with much higher wages in banking and accounting)
and male-dominated occupations. This finding suggests that the market economy
played its role by bringing the wages to different levels, and policies such as affirma-
tive action had only a limited effect on the level of the unexplained wage gap.
Nevertheless, the unexplained component of the wage gap was negative for female-
dominated occupations during communist era and the last transition years (1996,
1998, and 2000) and positive and relatively high in all other sectors during all
analyzed years. This finding might suggest that women working in female-dominated
occupations were rewarded better than their male peers in 1996, 1998 and 2000,
everything else being the same.5.3 Decomposing the occupational wage gap
Table 4 presents the observed occupational wage gap (MD-FD; MD-GI; and FD-GI)
and its components for men and women, respectively. The first component (i.e., en-
dowments) represents the wage difference due to observed and explained factors. The
second component (i.e., selectivity) contains wage effects from unobserved individual
characteristics that influence the wage of the individual. The third component (i.e.,
unexplained) should be seen as an occupational effect, expressing the fact that some
factors are rewarded differently in different occupations. All observed occupational
wage gaps were positive for men, whereas for women, the observed MD-FD differences
were negative but almost zero during the transition period and in 1994. Except for
these two periods, the occupational wage gaps were relatively lower for men than
for women. Most years, the men’s values were lower than 0.1 (or 10%), whereas
the women’s values were more often 0.1-0.2, indicating that men’s average wages
did not differ significantly over time. Moreover, the part of the men’s occupational
wage gap explained by endowments was positive only for the FD-GI gap during
the communist period and in 2000, and for the MD-FD gap in 1998. All other
twelve values were negative, which might suggest that the wages of “the average
observables” for men were lower in the first sector (MD or FD) than in the second (FD
or GI); here, first and second refer to the order of comparison. Nevertheless, the
women’s MD-FD gap explained by their endowments was positive and much higher
than the observed gap during all years of transition. This finding suggests that
“the average observables” for women was much higher in MD-occupations than in
FD-occupations.
The unexplained portion of the wage gap is often interpreted as a result of discrimin-
ation. Under this view, once differences among women in the relevant determinants of
wages are taken into account, any remaining difference in pay must be due to
Table 4 Occupational wage gap (owg) decomposition by gender
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Women
MD-FD owg Observed – 0.003 – 0.013 0.055 0.052 0.034
Endowments 0.113 0.077 0.112 0.116 0.168
Selectivity 1.186 0.985 0.961 0.941 1.051
Unexplained – 1.302 – 1.075 – 1.018 – 1.005 – 1.185
MD-GI owg Observed 0.415 0.120 0.203 0.200 0.199
Endowments 0.154 – 0.015 0.006 – 0.002 0.036
Selectivity 0.460 0.451 0.575 0.692 0.687
Unexplained – 0.199 – 0.316 – 0.378 – 0.490 – 0.523
FD-GI owg Observed 0.417 0.133 0.148 0.148 0.165
Endowments – 0.004 – 0.110 – 0.112 – 0.057 – 0.029
Selectivity – 0.726 – 0.534 – 0.385 – 0.248 – 0.365
Unexplained 1.147 0.778 0.646 0.453 0.560
Men
MD-FD owg Observed 0.015 0.040 0.039 0.053 0.034
Endowments – 0.064 – 0.026 – 0.045 0.006 – 0.085
Selectivity 0.207 0.967 0.700 0.181 – 0.669
Unexplained – 0.128 – 0.901 – 0.617 – 0.134 0.789
MD-GI owg Observed 0.126 0.067 0.057 0.079 0.126
Endowments – 0.018 – 0.040 – 0.036 – 0.025 – 0.045
Selectivity – 0.050 0.483 0.598 0.584 0.007
Unexplained 0.194 – 0.377 – 0.505 – 0.481 0.163
FD-GI owg Observed 0.110 0.026 0.019 0.026 0.091
Endowments 0.094 – 0.050 – 0.045 – 0.089 – 0.005
Selectivity – 0.257 – 0.484 – 0.102 0.404 0.676
Unexplained 0.273 0.560 0.166 – 0.288 – 0.580
Notes: Observed represents total wage gap in mean wages. The total wage gap is decomposed into three parts:
Endowments that represents the contribution to the wage gap from differences in observables; Selectivity represents the
contribution from differences in unobservables and, Unexplanied that represents the contribution from differences in
return to observables.
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not observe. However, except for women’s MD-FD samples, for all other samples, the
unexplained part of the gap was positive and, with a few exceptions, higher in magni-
tude than the observed gaps. During the communist era, this might be a direct reflec-
tion of the institutional settings of the labor market and the social security system,
which gave privileges (such as access to, e.g., day care, health care, and subsidized
lunches) only to workers from given companies, and the variation in the unexplained
part of the occupational wage gap during the transition period could be due to a rela-
tive improvement in unmeasured labor market skills. Nevertheless, the choice of occu-
pation is related to the institutional and democratic settings, and therefore, the results
are a reflection of the multitude of changes that occurred during the transition years.
An individual with preferences associated with a typical female occupation will be more
likely to enter an FD occupation than someone with preferences associated with a typ-
ical male occupation.
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Since the communist regime’s fall in December 1989, Romania has experienced pro-
found political, democratic, and economic transformations. The labor market is one
arena that has experienced the most market economy shocks, including the official
birth of unemployment and its social implications, the restructuring process of almost
all big industrial companies and the entire agricultural sector, the expansion of the
private sector, the composition of employment, and a decentralized system of wage
setting. All of these changes open up the question of whether the “planned equality” of
the communist regime transformed into a “market inequality” during the transition
years. Using data from cross-sectional household surveys conducted during the transi-
tion years in Romania, which include unique retrospective information about starting
wages and occupations since the 1960s, our results show that the unexplained part of
the gender wage gap was lower during the communist regime and higher during the
transition years.
Contrary to previous results based on data of Central and Eastern Europe that re-
veal that the gender wage gap generally decreased in the transition process, our re-
sults show that the gender wage differentials remained stable during the transition
years. This result may suggest that the structural changes that occurred in 1994–
2000 played a limited role in determining the gender wage gap for those who
worked. However, the more predominant reallocation of male labor from the public
to the private sector (due primarily to the mass privatization of the state enterprises)
was expected to increase wage inequality and to result in a wider gender wage gap.
Nevertheless, our result is in line with the literature that reported that the gender
wage gap has been relatively stable through the 1990s in several transition econ-
omies (Newell and Reilly 2000).
We found low values of the gender wage gap in female- and male-dominated occupa-
tions during the communist years, which supports the hypothesis that if solidarity
wage bargaining were effective in promoting equal pay for equal job types, then
controlling for job characteristics should generate an adjusted wage gap of zero. In
other words, this suggests some effects of wage bargaining in securing the equal
treatment of men and women in the Romanian labor market during the communist
regime.
The decomposition of the gender wage gap shows that the endowments (or the
observables) had a negative contribution to the overall difference. Moreover, during
the last analyzed transition years, the unexplained and the selection components of
the wage gap developed in opposite directions for male-dominated and female-
dominated occupations. The unexplained component was negative only for the
female-dominated occupations, which might suggest that women working in
the female-dominated occupations were getting a “gender bonus”. Nevertheless, the
“unadjusted” gender gap might be explained (largely) by nondiscriminatory factors,
such as family responsibilities and particularly the different involvement of men and
women in housework. However, given that the economy and society in general and
the labor market in particular experienced a multitude of complex changes during
the analyzed period, it is possible that much of the wage gap is due to institutional
norms, employer practices, and labor market policies. These three elements changed
continuously and reflect the structural conditions of the labor market and the
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ferent groups of people but also relative values of different occupations in society.
The fact that women were more risk adverse than men in the new free market economy
created an advantage for men, who become over-represented in higher wage occupations,
such as managers and politicians. Therefore, it is not surprising that occupational differ-
ences explain a significant portion of the overall gender wage gap during the transition
years. However, the macro statistics show that in the first years of the transition, men were
more affected than women by the restructuring and closing of big factories, and therefore,
it could be that men who did not find a job contributed to reducing the weight of the men
situated at the low end of the distribution of the offered wages. Although the labor
participation of men and women was high during the communist era (exceeding 90%) and
even in the first years of transition (approximately 75%), the selection biases—due to our
observation of only the wages of persons who worked in the formal sector—might be a rela-
tively high source of errors in the assessment of wage differentials between groups and in
the evaluation of the components of these differentials.
Nevertheless, our results indicate that the wage differences were, in general, much higher
among workers of the same gender working in different occupations than between men
and women working in the same occupational group, and women experienced a larger vari-
ation of occupational wage differentials than men during both regimes. These results seem
to be in line with earlier literature that supports the belief that gender differences in prefer-
ences play some role in gender differences in occupations (Gunderson 1989). The rise in
women’s acquisition of career-oriented formal education may reflect changes not only in
women’s preferences and their response to greater market opportunities but also in the ad-
mission practices of educational institutions and the responses of other institutions that
supported the promotion of women in a male-dominated world. In Romania, these factors
were strong during the communist period but weak, almost absent (in a broad
perspective), during the first years of transition; this might have contributed to the fact that
the gender wage gap was low during the communist regime and higher during the transi-
tion years. This implies that if policy makers are concerned with these issues, they should
help women more to gain a career-oriented formal education. Additionally, women should
be given assistance in becoming motivated to participate in the labor market in general but
also to choose occupations that match their education.
During the transition years analyzed in this paper, Romania had no sustained debate
about “making work pay;” instead, in the preparation for a European Union (EU) mem-
bership, the focus has been on preparing the legal and institutional processes and
developing economic and social policy in line with EU guidelines and requirements. How-
ever, the EU has an explicit commitment to raising the employment rate for women and
to advancing gender mainstreaming and gender equality in both employment and social
inclusion policies. Moreover, even the measure of the gender pay gap is part of the EU’s
list of “structural indicators” (designed, after the Lisbon Special European Council in
March 2000, to follow up on progress regarding employment and other issues).Endnotes
1e.g., Katz (1994, 1997), Newell and Reilly (1996) and Ogloblin (1999) using data after
the first years of transition in Russia, Jurajda (2003) using employer–employee data sets
Table 5 The public opinion about Who should be employed in the following domains
Domain Men Women Gender is not important
Agriculture 0.22 0.02 0.76
Mining and metallurgy 0.87 0 0.13
Textile industry 0.03 0.74 0.23
Construction 0.83 0 0.17
Transportation 0.64 0 0.37
Education 0.03 0.25 0.72
Health 0.03 0.21 0.76
Public administration 0.17 0.07 0.76
Non-Governmental organizations 0.12 0.10 0.77
Media 0.06 0.06 0.88
Food Industry/Commerce 0.03 0.25 0.72
Banking System 0.16 0.09 0.75
Justice 0.28 0.04 0.69
Government 0.42 0.02 0.56
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East (and West) Germany in 1995.
2The only two studies of the gender wage gap in Romania during the first years of
transition (e.g., Paternostro and David 1999; Skoufias 2003) reported similar results as
studies that used data from other socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union: the gender wage gap generally decreases in the transition
process (Brainerd 1998, 2000).
3The Gender Barometer of the Open Society Foundation covers a representative
sample of 1,839 persons aged 18 and over, and it is the first documented attempt to
examine the Romanian society in terms of the roles of men and women, their relation-
ships, and their everyday life (see Table 5).Figure 3 The distribution of the occupational groups, 1960–2000, selected years.
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1990) and England et al. (1988).
5The model, defined by equations (1)-(4) contains 4 stochastic components.
In principle, one can allow for any potential correlation among the stochastic compo-
nents. However, for a given individual, we only observe the actual wage and the indi-
cated occupational choice in pairs, and not simultaneously with wages in other
occupations. Therefore, the observability is partial, and we have to make inference onTable 6 Descriptive statistics, male-dominated occupations
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Wage# 1.472 1463.18 151.78 128.89 328.86 297.55 992.60 907.56 2348.77 2073.2
Age 27.69 25.0 39.27 37.60 39.11 37.97 39.68 38.80 39.60 39.06
Education
Lower education 0.76 0.66 0.67 0.56 0.66 0.53 0.65 0.49 0.61 0.48
Medium education 0.17 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.39 0.26 0.42 0.30 0.43
Higher education 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Region
R1: North-East 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16
R2: South-East 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
R3: South 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.15
R4: South-West 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
R5: West 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.09
R6: North-West 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12
R7: Center 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
R8: Bucharest 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13
Married 0.84 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.79
Urban 0.51 0.72 0.55 0.74 0.54 0.74 0.57 0.78 0.63 0.82
Ethnicity
Romanian 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94
Hungarian 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Other 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Sector
Agriculture 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.06
Industry 0.36 0.74 0.32 0.67 0.32 0.68 0.32 0.69
Services 0.42 0.14 0.49 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.55 0.25
Ownership
State 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.65 0.48 0.36
Private 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.37 0.47
Other 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Household
members
3.56 3.57 3.95 3.74 3.84 3.68 3.76 3.62 3.64 3.42
Multi-generation
household
0.12 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.13
Children <18 0.88 1.04 1.20 1.14 1.10 1.07 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.88
n 1190 351 3887 1025 3137 860 2680 643 2025 521
Note: #monthly wage in thousands of Romanian lei, and it is the starting wage for 1951–1989. This holds for all tables.
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data. In particular, cov(U1,ε), cov(U2,ε) and cov(U3,ε) are identified by the data
and are therefore allowed to be non-zero, while the covariances among the residuals
from the output equations, cov(U1,U2), cov(U1,U3) and cov(U2,U3), are left
unspecified. The variances of the output equations, var(U1), var(U2) and var(U3),
are identified, and we choose to normalize the variance of the residual of the
selection equation to 1.Table 7 Descriptive statistics, gender-integrated occupations
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Wage# 1371.11 1166.76 142.55 114.49 308.72 243.06 911.77 742.17 2062.32 1651.0
Age 28.20 26.90 38.89 38.07 38.83 38.00 39.37 38.70 39.62 38.62
Education
Lower education 0.77 0.72 0.59 0.50 0.64 0.52 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.47
Medium
education
0.17 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.36 0.28 0.37
Higher education 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16
Region
R1: North-East 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14
R2: South-East 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
R3: South 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.13
R4: South-West 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11
R5: West 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
R6: North-West 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16
R7: Center 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14
R8: Bucharest 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12
Married 0.82 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.72
Urban 0.52 0.57 0.65 0.79 0.62 0.74 0.66 0.77 0.68 0.77
Ethnicity
Romanian 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Hungarian 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Other 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Sector
Agriculture 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02
Industry 0.51 0.41 0.52 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.38
Services 0.42 0.55 0.41 0.56 0.44 0.59 0.47 0.60
Ownership
State 0.81 0.69 0.88 0.83 0.77 0.71 0.62 0.59 0.40 0.37
Private 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.43 0.45
Other 0.10 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Household
members
3.49 3.35 3.81 3.62 3.78 3.60 3.71 3.53 3.63 3.48
Multi-generation
household
0.13 0.08 0.22 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.20
Children <18 0.84 0.87 1.13 1.06 1.05 0.98 0.96 0.87 0.87 0.81
n 4934 4371 10671 8057 10202 7963 9097 7655 7224 6338
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and each of its components.
7See Jacobs (1995) and Hansen and Wahlberg (2008) for details about occupational
groups.
8We analyzed all cross-sections (1994-2000), but we report results for every second
year. Unfortunately, although originally designed as a panel, the data do not permit
linking of individual observations across all years.Table 8 Descriptive statistics, female-dominated occupations
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Wage# 1462.96 1388.34 141.99 127.22 311.25 276.84 926.18 841.49 2186.27 1885.4
Age 29.80 25.90 40.82 38.37 39.90 38.64 39.94 38.86 40.27 39.86
Education
Lower education 0.43 0.27 0.37 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.15
Medium
education
0.49 0.69 0.56 0.78 0.71 0.82 0.74 0.83 0.68 0.79
Higher education 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.06
Region
R1: North-East 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12
R2: South-East 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12
R3: South 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15
R4: South-West 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09
R5: West 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.11
R6: North-West 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.15
R7: Center 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14
R8: Bucharest 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11
Married 0.83 0.74 0.80 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.77
Urban 0.65 0.79 0.65 0.80 0.63 0.77 0.63 0.77 0.70 0.80
Ethnicity
Romanian 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.91
Hungarian 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08
Other 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sector
Agriculture 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
Industry 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.22
Services 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.73
Ownership
State 0.83 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.69 0.68 0.50 0.47
Private 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.33
Other 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Household
members
3.25 3.13 3.56 3.37 3.46 3.35 3.35 3.33 3.46 3.31
Multi-generation
household
0.12 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.16
Children <18 0.63 0.67 0.90 0.83 0.87 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.72
n 162 439 418 1491 391 1357 283 1157 309 1063
Table 9 Wage equation estimates by occupation, women, 1960-2000
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Male-dominated
Intercept 5.783 *** 3.685 *** 3.925 *** 4.541 *** 5.102 ***
Age 0.034 0.114 0.593 *** 0.480 *** 0.419 *
Age2/10 −0.009 −0.013 −0.080 *** −0.054 ** −0.044
Medium education −0.144 −0.068 −0.114 ** −0.133 ** −0.093
Higher education 0.318 *** 0.522 *** 0.527 *** 0.511 *** 0.762 ***
Married 0.049 0.015 −0.014 −0.027 −0.131 **
Urban 0.095 ** 0.069 ** 0.155 *** 0.048 0.036
Agriculture 0.265 *** −0.049 −0.024 −0.112 −0.142
Industry −0.032 0.085 0.146 *** 0.070 0.219 ***
State ownership −0.032 0.046 0.064 * −0.007 −0.029
Long-term contract −0.001 0.275 *** 0.038 0.175 0.447 ***
Multi-generation household 0.040 −0.107 ** −0.121 ** −0.121 ** −0.198 ***
Household members 0.008 −0.017 −0.003 0.006
Integrated
Intercept 5.213 *** 3.946 *** 4.451 *** 5.118 *** 6.134 ***
Age 0.090 0.189 *** 0.255 *** 0.268 *** 0.179 ***
Age2/10 −0.022 * −0.019 *** −0.026 *** −0.024 *** −0.012 *
Medium education 0.001 0.024 * 0.029 ** 0.045 *** 0.021
Higher education 0.363 *** 0.479 *** 0.522 *** 0.522 *** 0.532 ***
Married 0.019 0.001 0.010 0.007 −0.007
Urban 0.267 *** 0.107 *** 0.130 *** 0.117 *** 0.095 ***
Agriculture −0.056 0.103 ** 0.088 ** 0.078 ** 0.106 **
Industry −0.116 * 0.067 0.036 0.100 *** 0.084 *
State ownership 0.000 0.043 −0.057 * −0.024
Long-term contract 0.064 ** 0.221 *** 0.169 *** 0.164 ***
Multi-generation household
Household members −0.005 −0.015 *** −0.018 *** −0.016 *** −0.032 ***
Female-dominated
Intercept 6.911 *** 4.947 *** 5.359 *** 6.038 *** 6.577 ***
Age 0.211 0.151 0.285 *** 0.285 ** 0.300 **
Age2/10 −0.026 −0.016 −0.030 ** −0.029 * −0.029 *
Medium education −0.216 *** −0.135 *** −0.145 *** −0.070 * −0.020
Higher education 0.319 *** 0.207 *** 0.278 *** 0.212 *** 0.255 ***
Married −0.069 −0.033 −0.069 ** −0.038 0.000
Urban 0.054 0.119 *** 0.114 *** 0.062 ** 0.076 **
Agriculture 0.121 ** 0.191 *** 0.262 *** 0.055 0.020
Industry 0.113 *** 0.246 *** 0.198 *** 0.127 *** 0.119 ***
State ownership 0.001 0.005 −0.052 ** −0.008 −0.008
Long-term contract 0.025 0.082 0.092 −0.013 0.234 **
Multi-generation household 0.081 −0.089 ** −0.124 *** −0.074 * −0.044
Household members 0.013 0.003 −0.024 ** −0.015
Note: we also control for region (5 dummies), ownership (3 dummies), and “time” (5 dummies controlling for the five-
year periods for the communist period, and 11 monthly dummies for the transition years). This note holds also for the
next table.
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Table 10 Wage equation estimates by occupation, men, 1960-2000
1960-89 1994 1996 1998 2000
Male-dominated
Intercept 6.264 *** 3.887 *** 4.126 *** 5.560 *** 7.054 ***
Age 0.146 0.283 *** 0.404 *** 0.068 0.315 ***
Age2/10 −0.016 −0.035 *** −0.049 *** −0.006 −0.033 ***
Medium education 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.198 ***
Higher education 0.357 *** 0.409 *** 0.409 *** 0.438 *** 0.829 ***
Married −0.031 0.076 *** 0.116 *** 0.166 *** 0.048
Urban 0.072 *** 0.094 *** 0.141 *** 0.091 *** 0.127 ***
Agriculture 0.060 * −0.118 *** −0.100 *** −0.104 *** −0.428 ***
Industry 0.054 0.003 0.036 ** 0.050 *** 0.138 ***
State ownership −0.058 0.028 0.078 *** 0.127 *** 0.107 ***
Long-term contract 0.002 0.144 *** 0.128 *** 0.074 0.082
Multi-generation household −0.011 −0.073 *** −0.073 *** −0.091 *** −0.029
Household members −0.003 −0.010 * −0.015 ** −0.008
Integrated
Intercept 5.702 *** 4.231 *** 4.762 *** 5.451 *** 5.993 ***
Age 0.038 0.281 *** 0.310 *** 0.326 *** 0.314 ***
Age2/10 −0.003 −0.034 *** −0.036 *** −0.037 *** −0.031 ***
Medium education 0.059 *** −0.002 −0.004 0.025 ** 0.116 ***
Higher education 0.285 *** 0.309 *** 0.347 *** 0.373 *** 0.466 ***
Married 0.020 0.079 *** 0.083 *** 0.122 *** 0.088 ***
Urban 0.165 *** 0.099 *** 0.120 *** 0.123 *** 0.117 ***
Agriculture 0.376 *** −0.005 −0.007 −0.088 *** −0.199 ***
Industry 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.130 *** 0.124 *** 0.134 ***
State ownership −0.014 0.050 *** 0.069 *** 0.076 *** 0.062 ***
Long-term contract 0.006 0.070 *** 0.159 *** 0.154 *** 0.157 ***
Multi-generation household 0.002 −0.085 *** −0.096 *** −0.077 *** −0.109 ***
Household members −0.011 *** −0.006 * −0.010 *** −0.002
Female-dominated
Intercept 5.417 *** 4.374 *** 4.731 *** 5.501 *** 5.909 ***
Age 0.596 ** 0.462 *** 0.553 *** 0.387 −0.166
Age2/10 −0.068 * −0.055 *** −0.060 *** −0.044 0.027
Medium education 0.131 * −0.114 *** −0.119 ** −0.102 0.111 *
Higher education 0.269 ** 0.121 0.087 0.282 ** 0.337 ***
Married −0.111 0.080 0.156 ** 0.014 0.161 **
Urban 0.256 *** 0.187 *** 0.176 *** 0.043 0.083
Agriculture 0.043 0.184 ** −0.001 −0.096 −0.280 ***
Industry −0.120 0.072 0.104 0.046 0.073
State ownership −0.159 0.050 −0.030 −0.026 0.099 **
Long-term contract 0.065 ** 0.170 −0.022 −0.013 −0.094
Multi-generation household −0.254 * −0.070 0.028 −0.170 ** 0.004
Household members −0.020 −0.039 ** −0.016 0.009
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10The distribution of individuals across these three groups was almost the same
when we chose another cutting point (e.g., 25%, 30%, 35%). Figure 3 shows the
evolution of these groups during 1951-2000. We divide the period before 1990’s
into 5-year periods that overlap five-year development plans. Tables 6, 7 and
8 present basic descriptive statistics (by gender) for some variables used in the
empirical analysis.
11See Andrén (2012) for a detailed description and analysis of wage differences
between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians.
12Tables 9 and 10 present the estimates of domain-specific (i.e., MD, GI and FD)
wage equations for men and women respectively.
13However, a non-zero effect could also be due to lack of controlling for relevant
variables.
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